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Abstract 
This paper considers the impact of taxation policy on market work.  On the basis of the 
evidence, we find that a 10 percentage point rise in the tax wedge will reduce overall labour 
input provided via the market by around 2 per cent of the population of working age.  The tax 
wedge is the sum of the payroll, income and consumption tax rates. 
 This only explains a minority of the market work differentials across count ries.  Much 
of the remainder is probably down to the differences in the social security systems supporting 
the unemployed, the sick and disabled and the early retired. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
One of the most interesting features of the developed world is the fact that people in some 
countries work much harder than in others.  By work, we mean work in the market, not work 
overall, which is an important distinction.  For example, US and German households spend 
around the same proportion of their income on “food and beverages”.  However, in the US, 
around a half of this goes to restaurants, compared with only one quarter in Germany.  Far 
more time in the latter country is spent on food preparation at home (see Freeman and 
Schettkat, 2001)1.  Despite this, in what follows we focus on market work, where the 
differences across countries are startling.  For example, the average person of working age 
(16-64) works around 46 per cent more in the United States than in Belgium (see Table 1).  A 
little over half of his difference is because more people in the US are in employment with the 
remaining difference arising from the fact that those in employment in the US tend to work 
more hours per year.  These substantial differences explain the majority of the variation in 
GDP per capita among the advanced countries of the OECD, with differences in productivity 
making a significantly smaller contribution.  
 When confronted with these differences, it is natural to look at the incentives to 
engage in market work relative to other activities in the different countries.  The particular 
feature of these incentives on which we shall focus are those embedded in the tax system.  To 
be more precise, we shall concentrate on taxes on employment paid by firms (payroll taxes), 
taxes on income paid by individuals and taxes on consumption paid by individuals.  
Important features of the overall incentive structure which we shall not discuss in detail 
include the unemployment benefit system, the sickness and disability benefit system and the 
early retirement benefit system.  These are obviously an important part of the overall picture 
given that those in the population of working age who do not work fall into five major 
categories, namely full- time students, the unemployed, the sick and disabled, the early retired 
and those looking after their family. 
 In what follows, we look briefly at the theoretical background in the next section.  
Then in Section 3 we present an array of results on taxes, wages and employment and in 
Section 4 we consider non-employment among different sub-groups of the population of 
working age.  We finish with a summary and some general conclusions. 
                                                 
1 Who gets the better dinners is, as yet, an unresolved question. 
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2.  Theoretical Background 
 
A great deal has been written on taxation and employment and useful summaries are provided 
by Pissarides (1998) or Koskela (2002).  The basic model looks something like the following.  
Using a representative agent model, with the population of working age normalised to unity, 
we may define h as (market) work and then (1-h) is non-work.  Let output y be generated by 
the production function: 
  aa hBky -= 1         (1) 
where k is capital.  Representative utility is given by  
  ( )hcu -+= 1lnln q        (2) 
where c is consumption.  Suppose W is nominal labour cost per employee and P is the price 
of the firm’s output.  So PWw = is the real labour cost per employee facing the firm.  Then 
suppose we have proportional tax rates as follows.  The payroll tax rate is 1t , the income tax 
rate is 2t , the consumption tax rate is 3t .  Then the real post-tax consumption wage is given 
by  
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Sot is the “tax wedge” between the real labour cost per employee facing the firm and the real 
post-tax consumption wage.  Note that t is given by 
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In equilibrium, the marginal product of labour is equal to real labour cost per employee and 
the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is equal to the real post-tax 
consumption wage.  Thus we have  
  why =a         (5) 
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which is diminishing in t .2  The size of the impact of t  depends crucially on q .  Prescott 
(2002) calibrates this equation and uses it to generate predicted labour supply for seven 
OECD countries and finds that it matches actual labour supply quite closely.  How his results 
square with others in this area is discussed in the next section. 
 It might, however, be argued that in Europe, some sort of bargaining model of wage 
determination would be more realistic.  Suppose we have identical firms, labelled i, and that 
wages are determined by a Nash bargain which maximises 
  ( ) ( )( )[ ] iniii Aywwh P-+- bg t1     (8) 
where ny is real, post-tax, per capita non- labour income, A is expected alternative income if 
not employed in firm i and P is the firm’s profit.  The parameter g measures the extent to 
which the worker takes account of the employment effects of the wage bargain.  Purely 
individualistic bargaining would be associated with low levels of g , collective bargaining 
with high levels.  The b parameter captures the relative strength of the worker in the bargain.  
 Expected alternative income A consists of two elements, that generated by 
employment in another firm with income ( ) nyw +- t1 , probability h , and that generated by 
non-employment with income ( ) zybw n ++-t1 , probability ( )h-1 .  b represents non-
employment benefit relative to post-tax employment income, z captures the real value of the 
leisure when not employed.  So A is given by 
  ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )zybwhywhA nn ++--++-= tt 111     (9) 
 If (8) is maximised with respect to iw  and noting that the production function (1) 
ensures that ( ) ( )a-a=Pa--=¶¶ - 1hw1wnhn iii1ii //,/ ll , the first order condition 
implies that 
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Noting that identical firms implies that wwi = , and using (9), (10) becomes 
  ( )( ) ( ) ( )a+bga-b=--- 1zb1h1     (11) 
                                                 
2 Of course (7) is not the end of the story, because c/y is endogenous.  Typically, however, this ratio is 
determined by factors other than the tax wedge.  For example, if there is no capital and all government 
expenditure is provided to the population in the form of consumption, then c/y=1 whatever the level of taxes 
and government expenditure. 
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where ( )t-= 1wzz .  So, in this context, the only reason why taxes impact on employment 
is because the value of leisure enters “income” while not working and is unaffected by a 
change in the tax wedge.  Non-labour income plays no role essentially because in this model, 
only the difference between income when employed and when not employed is relevant and 
non- labour income is eliminated.  
 Suppose we define potential output, y , by 
                                a-= 1Aky ,      (12) 
that is the output if the whole population works.  Then        
                               ( ) ( )taa -=-= - 1/1/ 1 yzhzwzz and (11) becomes  
                           ( ) (( )( ) ( )
a+bg
a-b
=t-a--- a-
1
)1/hy/zb1h1 1    (13) 
which implies 0/ <¶¶ th so long as benefits and the value of leisure are less than the post-tax 
wage.  Of course, if this were not the case, no one would work. 
 In these models, market work depends only on the total tax wedge,t .  There are a 
number of reasons why the impact of the different tax elements of t  on market work may 
differ.  First, in the above model, suppose the utility of income is not linear.  Then non- labour 
income is not eliminated.  Since non- labour income is typically not subject to payroll taxes, 
then the impact of the payroll tax rate on work may differ form that of the income tax or 
consumption tax rate (see Hoon and Phelps, 1995 for example).  Second, suppose there is a 
wage floor, because of minimum wage laws, for example.  Then, for those at or near the 
wage floor, a switch from income taxes to payroll taxes will reduce employment.  Third, the 
fact that, in practice, the tax base for the three different taxes generally differs ensures that 
switches between them will not be neutral.   
 Another feature of these models is that the taxes are all proportional.  Income taxes 
are often progressive and the degree of progressivity may, itself, have an independent impact.  
For example, in a bargaining model, increased progressivity leads to lower wage demands 
because wage increases are less valuable and this generates more work.  The standard labour 
supply effect, however, typically goes in the other direction. 
 To summarise, therefore, there are good theoretical reasons why the total tax wedge 
may have a negative impact on work and why the individual tax rates which make up the 
total wedge may have differing effects.  The size of these potential effects is obviously an 
empirical matter, so this is the topic of the next section. 
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3.  Tax Effects on Work and Pay 
 
We start by looking at the general size of the tax wedge in the OECD countries over the years 
(see Table 2).  All countries exhibit a substantial increase over the period from the 1960s to 
the 1990s although there are wide variations across countries.  These mainly reflect the extent 
to which health, higher education and pensions are publicly provided along with the all-round 
generosity of the social security system.  Some countries have made significant attempts to 
reduce labour taxes in recent years, notably the Netherlands and the UK.  Underlying these 
numbers are some significant variations in the individual tax rate5 notably Denmark and 
Australia have tiny payroll tax rates whereas as those in Italy and France are very substantial, 
being around 40 per cent. 
 Turning to the evidence, this comes typically in two forms.  The first is the impact of 
taxes on labour costs per employee facing firms, the second focuses directly on the effect of 
taxes on aspects of labour input.  The former is relevant because in order for taxes to reduce 
work, they must raise labour costs per employee so that firms reduce their demand for labour.  
If tax increases leave labour costs per employee unchanged, then they are all shifted onto 
labour and employment is unaffected.  In the remainder of this section, we first consider 
whether different taxes have different effects.  Then we look at the impact of the tax wedge 
on real labour costs per employee and finally the impact of the tax wedge on aggregate labour 
input. 
 
Different tax effects 
 
The key issue here is whether different taxes exhibit differential rates of shifting onto labour.  
There are a large number of time series wage equations for various countries which show 
different degrees of shifting onto labour for different taxes.  There is no pattern to these 
numbers3, many of which are summarised in Layard et al (1991) p.210, OECD (1994), p.247, 
Disney (2000), and Koskela (2002).  Some intensive cross-country investigations may be 
found in the work of Tyrväinen reported in OECD (1994), Table 9.5 and in that of Robertson 
and Symons in OECD (1990), Annex 6A.  In both these wide-ranging studies, there is no 
significant evidence that payroll, income or consumption taxes have a differential impact on 
labour costs and hence on unemployment.  As the OECD Jobs Study (1994) remarks, 
 6  
“Changes in the mix of taxes by which governments raise revenues can be expected, at most, 
to have a limited effect on unemployment” (p. 275). 
 
Tax wedge effects on real labour cost per employee 
 
In OECD (1990), Annex 6, a simple test of the impact of tax rates on labour costs is carried 
out as follows.  We have labour demand and labour supply equations of the form 
 ( ) ,1 KwfN D =  ( )LzTwfN S ,2 -=  
where N = employment, w = ln (real labour cost), K = capital stock, T = (t1+t2+t3), the total 
tax rate, L = the labour force, z = exogenous factors.  Then the reduced form wage equation is 
 
 w = g(T,K/L,z). 
 
If w is independent of T in the long run, the labour market behaves as if labour supply is 
inelastic and taxes are all shifted onto labour.  Employment, and hence unemployment is then 
unaffected by T in the long run.  The following equation represents the average coefficients 
and t statistics for individual time series regressions on 16 OECD countries (1955-86). 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )6.26.00.2)7.8(
.52.008.0)/(181.079.0 1 TTLKnww D+-+= -  
Thus total taxes, T, have no long-run effects on labour costs although they have a substantial 
and long- lasting short-run effect via TD  (and the high level of persistence in wages).  
Consistent with this result is the work discussed in Gruber (1997) on the incidence of payroll 
taxation.  Gruber studies the impact on wages and employment at the micro level of the sharp 
exogenous reduction in payroll tax rates (of around 25 percentage points!) which took place 
in Chile over the period 1979-86.  His analysis of a large number of individual firms indicates 
that wages adjust completely to this payroll tax shift and there is no employment effect 
whatever. 
 In contrast to this result, two multi-country studies find significant tax wedge effects 
on labour costs.  Daveri and Tabellini (2000) find that a 10 percentage point increase in the 
tax wedge raises real labour costs by 5 per cent in the long run for a select group of 
                                                                                                                                                        
3 The problem in single country time series investigations is discriminating between permanent effects and 
temporary effects which persist for a long time. 
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countries4, although there are few controls for other labour market institutions (see Table 11, 
col. 1).  Nickell et al (2003) report an equivalent figure of 3.7 per cent controlling for a 
complete set of labour market institutions (see Table 12. col.1).  Many others have found 
significant tax wedge effects on labour costs, and some have argued that the size of these tax 
wedge effects depends significantly on those labour market institutions connected with 
flexibility (see Liebfritz et al, 1997 and Daveri and Tabellini, 1997).  In order to pursue this, 
we set out some results on the impact of the tax wedge on labour costs in Table 3.  The first 
point to note is how wildly the numbers and the rankings fluctuate across the columns.  This 
is basically due to variations in the other variables included in the labour cost equations and 
emphasises the fragility of most of the results in this area.  Second, in order to see if there is 
any relationship between tax wedge effects and labour market flexibility we regressed the 
average tax wedge effect on some institutional variables to obtain: 
Tax wedge effect = Constant +    0.030 employment protection 
                        (0.9)  
- 0.005 labour standards 
(0.1) 
- 0.16 co-ordination (union + employer) 
                                                     (1.7) 
+   0.004 union density (average) 
         (0.6) 
    N = 20, R2 = 0.23. 
  
While most of the signs are consistent with the hypothesis, the negative impact of wage 
bargaining co-ordination is the only one which is significant (at the 10 per cent level).  So the 
evidence in favour of the hypothesis that flexibility reduces tax wedge effects is not strong.  
Overall, however, the balance of the evidence suggests that there is probably some overall 
adverse tax effect on real labour costs per employee.  The possible consequences for the 
impact on employment we report in the next section. 
 
Tax wedge effects on employment 
 
An array of results in this area is presented in Table 4.  While there is some variability, 
overall they tell a reasonably consistent story.  If we omit the outliers on the high side 
(Prescott, 2002; Daveri and Tabellini, 2000; Planas et al, 2003) on the grounds that they 
exclude important control variables, we find that a 10 percentage point rise in the tax wedge 
reduces labour input by somewhere between 1 and 3 per cent of the population of working 
                                                 
4 Namely Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, UK (pre -1980). 
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age.  Taking an average point estimate as 2 per cent, this is a relatively small but by no means 
insignificant effect.  For example, the average rise in the tax wedge in the advanced OECD 
countries from the early 1960s to the late 1990s is around 15 percentage points, worth a 
reduction in labour input of around 3 per cent of the population of working age 5.  Comparing 
the big three countries of continental Europe (France, Germany and Italy) with the United 
States, the difference in the tax wedge (around 16 percentage points) would explain around 
3.2 percentage points of the difference in total labour input which is around one quarter of the 
overall difference in the employment rate.  The remainder would be down to other factors 
including, in particular, the substantial differences in the social security systems, as well as 
other labour market institutions.  In the next section we pursue these issues a little further by 
looking more closely at the labour input rates for different groups in the working age 
population. 
 
 
4.  Labour Inputs Across Different Groups 
 
The overall picture for OECD countries is presented in Tables 5 and 6.  We ignore inactivity 
rates among the young because these are strongly influenced by the extent of post-school 
education and whether or not post-school education takes place mainly within educational 
institutions, as in the US, or in firms, as in Germany. 
 Focusing first on prime age men (age 25-54), we see that even among this group, in 
most countries more are inactive than are unemployed.  Furthermore, the inactivity rate in 
this group is higher in the US than in the European Union.  Interestingly, most inactive men 
in this age group are classified as sick or disabled, the majority of whom are claiming some 
form of state benefit.  Furthermore, the size of this disability group has risen substantially 
since the 1970s in nearly every country, and in those which have been analysed, this increase 
has been driven by changes in the entry rules and the available benefits (see Bound and 
Burkhauser, 1999, for some detailed evidence). 
 Among older men, unemployment rates are generally much the same as for prime age 
men, but inactivity rates are enormously larger and vary dramatically from one country to 
another.  In some European countries, more than half the older men are inactive, whereas in 
                                                 
5 In fact the average employment/population ratio in these same countries has risen over the same period, so 
there are obviously other forces at work aside from taxes.  This overall change is because the rise in the 
employment/population ratio among women has more than offset the fall among men. 
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Norway and Sweden, the inactivity rate is closer to one quarter.  As Blondal and Scarpetta 
(1998) note, these large cross-country variations were not apparent as recently as 1971, when 
nearly all the countries had inactivity rates for this group below 20 per cent, the major 
exception being Italy with a rate of 41 per cent, (see Blondal and Scarpetta, 1998, Table V.1, 
p.72).  The main factor explaining the current variations and the consequent large changes 
since 1971 has been the structure of the social security system.  Incentives for men to stay in 
the labour force vary widely, with generous incentives to retire early being introduced in 
many countries.  This was often done in order to reduce labour supply in the mistaken view 
that this would help to resolve the problem of unemployment.  As a consequence, Belgium, 
France, Germany and Italy, for example, all have exceptionally high inactivity rates among 
older men on top of their exceptionally high unemployment rates. 
 Inactivity rates among women aged 25 to 54 also vary widely, with the Scandinavian 
countries having the lowest rates in the OECD, and Italy and Spain having the highest.  While 
the majority of inactive women in this age group report themselves as looking after their 
family, Italy and Spain in fact have the lowest fertility rates in the OECD.  What is important 
here is the structure of the tax system, particularly the marginal tax rate facing wives when 
their husbands work, the existence of barriers to part-time work, and the availability of 
publicly funded child care.  A key tax issue which is relevant here is whether husbands and 
wives are taxed jointly or separately (see OECD, 1990, Table 6.3.) 
 Finally, it is worth noting how unemployment in Italy, Spain and to a lesser extent 
France is heavily concentrated among young people and women.  This is partly due to the 
role of employment protection laws in generating barriers to employment for new entrants 
and partly due to the social mores surrounding entry into work.  For example, in Italy many 
young people, particularly if they are well qualified, will live at home for many years without 
working but effectively queuing for a particularly desirable job and contributing to measured 
unemployment (although perhaps not to true unemployment). 
 To summarise, looking at different sub-groups of the working age population, the 
numbers suggest that many factors other than standard tax rates are important in determining 
the extent of non-employment.  This is consistent with the overall conclusion of the previous 
section that tax rates explain only a fraction, albeit a significant one, of the cross-country 
differences in employment rates (see also Bertola et al, 2002 where the results have similar 
implications). 
 
 
 10  
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
 
Our basic conclusion is that tax rates are a significant factor in explaining differences in the 
amount of market work undertaken by the working age population in different countries.  
However, the evidence suggests that tax rate differentials only explain a minority of the 
market work differentials, the majority being explained by other relevant labour market 
institutions.  Particularly important are the differences in social security systems which 
provide income support to various non-working groups including the unemployed, the sick 
and disabled, and the early retired. 
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Table 1 
A Picture of Employment and Unemployment in the OECD in 2001 
 
 
 
Unemployment (%) Inactivity 
Rate (%) 
Employment 
Rate (%) 
Hours per 
year 
Ave 
hours 
per 
week 
 2001 2002 
(latest 
data)** 
    
Europe       
Austria 3.6 4.1 29.3 67.8 - - 
Belgium 6.6 6.9 36.4 59.7 1528 17.5 
Denmark 4.3 4.2 21.8 75.9 1482 21.6 
Finland 9.1 8.9 25.4 67.7 1694 22.0 
France 8.6 9.2 32.0 62.0 1532 18.3 
Germany 7.9 8.3 28.4 65.9 1467 18.6 
Ireland 3.8 4.4 32.5 65.0 1674 20.9 
Italy 9.5 9.2 39.3 54.9 1606 17.0 
Netherlands 2.4 2.8 24.3 74.1 1346 19.2 
Norway 3.6 3.9 19.7 77.5 1364 20.3 
Portugal 4.1 4.4 28.2 68.7        2009*** 26.5 
Spain 10.7 11.2 34.2 58.8 1816 20.5 
Sweden 5.1 5.0 20.7 75.3 1603 23.2 
Switzerland 2.6 2.6 18.8 79.1   1568* 23.8 
UK 5.0 5.2 25.1 71.3 1711 23.5 
EU 
 
Non-Europe 
7.6 - 30.8 64.1 - 
 
- 
Australia 6.7 6.5 26.2 68.9 1837 24.4 
Canada 7.2 7.5 23.5 70.9   1801* 24.6 
Japan 5.0 5.4 27.4 68.8   1821* 24.1 
New Zealand 5.3 5.3 24.1 71.8 1817 25.1 
US 4.8 5.6 23.2 73.1 1821 25.6 
 
*refers to 2000.  **refers to the period between Feb and Aug 2002.  *** refers to 1994. 
 
OECD Employment Outlook 2002, Tables A, B, F. 
 
Unemployment is based on OECD standardised rates.  These approximate the ILO definition.  Hours per year 
is an average over all workers, part-time and full time.  Average hours per week refers to the entire population 
of working age and is equal to the proportional employment rate x hours per year ¸ 52. 
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Table 2 
 
Total Taxes on Labour 
 
Payroll Tax Rate plus Income Tax Rate plus Consumption Tax Rate 
 
Total Tax Rate (%) 
 
 1960-64 1965-72 1973-79 1980-87 1988-95 1996-2000 
 
Australia 28 31 36 39 -         - 
Austria 47 52 55 58 59                    66 
Belgium 38 43 44 46 49                    51 
Canada 31 39 41 42 50                    53 
Denmark 32 46 53 59 60                    61 
Finland 38 46 55 58 64                    62 
France 55 57 60 65 67                    68 
Germany (W) 43 44 48 50 52                    50 
Ireland 23 30 30 37 41                    33 
Italy 57 56 54 56 67                    64 
Japan 25 25 26 33 33                    37 
Netherlands 45 54 57 55 47                    43 
Norway - 52 61 65 61                    60 
New Zealand - - 29 30 -                      - 
Portugal 20 25 26 33 41                    39 
Spain 19 23 29 40 46                    45 
Sweden 41 54 68 77 78                    77 
Switzerland 30 31 35 36 36                    36 
UK 34 43 45 51 47                    44 
USA 34 37 42 44 45                    45 
 
 
Note:   
These data are based on the London School of Economics, Centre for Economic Performance OECD dataset 
(see the data attached to DP502 at http://cep.lse.ac.uk/papers/).  They are mainly based on OECD National 
Accounts as follows: 
 
(i) Payroll tax rate = EC/(IE-EC),EC=EPP+ESS.EPP = employers’ private pensions and welfare plans 
contributions, ESS = employers’ social security contributions, IE = compensations of employees. 
(ii) Income tax rate = (WC+IT)/HCR. WC  = employees’ social security contributions, IT = income taxes, 
HCR = households’ current receipts. 
(iii) Consumption tax rate = (TX-SB)/CC.  TX = indirect taxes, SB = subsidies, CC = private final 
consumption expenditure.  The inclusion of EPP in the payroll tax rate may be subject to debate.  
Excluding this term has little impact on the broad overall pattern of the numbers. 
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Table 3 
 
Percentage Increase in Real Labour Cost in Response 
To a One Percentage Point Rise in the Tax Wedge 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 BLN T AP P-SK Kvd W Average 
 
Austria 0   0  0 
Belgium 3.4  .37 .95  1.57 
Denmark 0  .28 0  0.09 
Finland 0.2 0.5 0.28   0.33 
France 0.5 0.4 0.37 0 0.56 0.37 
Germany (W) 0 1.0 0.37 0 0.72 0.42 
Ireland 1.4     1.4 
Italy 0.3 0.4 0 0 1.03 0.35 
Netherlands 0.4  0.37 0 1.15 0.48 
Norway 0.2  0.28   0.24 
Spain 1.0     1.0 
Sweden 0.5 0.6 0.28 0.73 0.70 0.56 
Switzerland 1.4     1.4 
UK 1.3 0.25 0 0 0.58 0.43 
Japan 0 0.5 0  1.19 0.42 
Australia - 0.5 0.37  1.64 0.84 
New Zealand 0     0 
Canada 1.5 0.8 0  0.59 0.72 
US 0.1  0  0.43 0.18 
 
BLN = Bean et al (1986), Table 3 and 5 (except the number for Spain  which is taken from  
  Dolado et al (1986). 
 
T = Tryväinen (1995) as reported in OECD Jobs Study (1994), Table 9.5 (except  
   Sweden’s number which is from Holmlund and Kolm (1995). 
 
AP = Alesina and Perotti (1994), Table 7, Col. 4. 
 
P-SK = Padoa-Schioppa Kostoris (1992). 
 
Kvd W = Knoester and van de Windt (1987). 
 
Some of these numbers are taken directly from Leibfritz et al (1997), Table A1.5. 
 
The tax wedge definitions differ somewhat between columns:  1, 2, 4 use the sum of payroll, income and 
consumption tax rates;  3, 5 omit the consumption tax rate. 
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Table 4 
Recent Results on the Impact of Taxation on Employment 
Long-run impact on employment/population rate (%) of a 10 percentage point rise in the tax wedge. 
Cross-section or random effects panel 
Reference Impact  
(percentage 
points) 
 
Sample Controls 
Scarpetta (1996)  
(Table 4, col. 3) ) 
-0.3 17 OECD countries 
1983-93 
Standard labour market 
institutions 
Nickell and Layard (1999) 
(Table 16, col.1) 
-2.4 20 OECD countries 
1983-94 
Ditto 
Fixed effects panel 
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2001)  
(Table 5, col.1) 
-1.5 20 OECD countries 
1982-98 
Ditto 
Nickell et al (2003) 
(Table 15, col.1) 
-2.7 20 OECD countries 
1961-92 
Ditto 
Long-run imp act on average hours per week worked by the population of working age (see Table 1, 
final column) of a 10 percentage point rise in the tax wedge. 
Cross-section or random effects panel 
Nickell and Layard (1999) 
Table 16, col.3) 
-1.0 hours 
(-2.5 pps)a 
20 OECD countries 
1983-94 
Standard labour market 
institutions 
Prescott (2002)b 
(Table 3) 
-3.0 hours 
(-7.5 pps)a 
7 OECD countries 
1993-96 
No controls  
Long-run impact on the unemployment rate (%) of a 10 percentage point rise in the tax wedge. 
Euro area aggregate time series 
Planas (Table 2,3) et al (2003)            3.2                  Euro area aggregate           No controls  
                                                                                     1970-2002 
Cross-section or random effects panel 
Scarpetta (1996) 
(Table 3, col.3) 
1.1 17 OECD countries 
1983-93 
Standard labour market 
institutions 
Elmeskov et al (1998) 
(Table 4, col.4) 
1.2 18 OECD countries 
1983-95 
Ditto 
Impact at average 
levels of co-ordination 
Nickell and Layard (1999) 
(Table 15, col.1) 
2.0 20 OECD countries 
1983-94 
Ditto 
Fixed effects panel 
Daveri and Tabellini (2000) 
(Table 9, col.1) 
5.5 14 OECD countries 
1965-91 
Restricted set of labour 
market institutions. 
Impact at average 
levels of co-ordination. 
Nickell et al (2003) 
(Table 13, col.1) 
1.1 20 OECD countries 
1961-92 
Standard labour market 
institutions. 
Impact at average 
levels of co-ordination. 
Notes:    
a) An impact of x hours on average weekly working hours is equivalent to 2.5x percentage  
 points (pps) taking a full work week as 40 hours. 
b) Prescott computes the tax wedge and predicted hours for seven countries.  For each country  
we compute (predicted hours - )ourspredictedh ( )taxwedgetaxwedge -¸  where the 
means are across the countries.  The computed impact is the average of this ratio 
across the seven countries.  It is also worth noting that Prescott approximates a 
measure of the marginal tax wedge by multiplying the income tax rate by 1.6 in all 
countries.  In practice this makes little difference to the overall cross-country pattern 
of the tax wedge. 
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Table 5 
Unemployment, Inactivity and Employment by Age and Gender in 2001 
 
 
Unemployment (%) Inactivity Rate (%) Employment Rate (%) 
 Men Women Men Women Men Women 
 25-54 55-64 25-54 55-64 25-54 55-64 25-54 55-64 25-54 55-64 25-54 55-64 
Europe             
Austria 3.4 5.7 3.8 5.2 6.5 59.8 23.1 81.7 90.3 37.9 74.0 17.4 
Belgium 4.8 3.9 6.1 0.9 9.1 63.4 29.3 84.2 86.5 35.1 66.4 15.6 
Denmark 2.9 4.0 4.1 4.0 8.6 34.3 16.5 48.1 88.7 63.1 80.1 49.8 
Finland 6.9 8.9 8.0 8.8 9.0 48.8 15.0 50.5 84.7 46.7 78.2 45.1 
France 6.3 5.6 10.1 6.6 5.9 56.2 21.3 65.9 88.1 41.4 70.8 31.8 
Germany 7.3 10.3 7.7 12.5 5.7 49.4 21.7 67.6 87.5 45.4 72.2 28.4 
Ireland 3.4 2.6 3.0 2.7 8.2 33.6 33.9 70.8 88.7 64.6 64.1 28.4 
Italya 6.4 4.6 12.5 4.9 9.6 57.8 42.1 84.1 84.6 40.3 50.7 15.2 
Netherlands 1.4 1.7 2.1 1.1 6.0 48.6 25.8 71.7 92.7 50.5 72.6 28.0 
Norway 2.7 1.7 2.5 1.4 8.6 26.4 16.7 36.8 88.9 72.3 81.2 62.3 
Portugal 2.6 3.2 4.4 3.1 7.2 36.4 21.9 58.1 90.4 61.6 74.7 40.6 
Spain 6.3 5.6 13.7 8.0 8.4 38.6 38.8 76.4 85.9 57.9 52.8 21.8 
Sweden 4.4 5.3 3.7 4.5 9.4 26.5 14.4 32.7 86.6 69.6 82.5 64.3 
Switzerland 1.0 1.8 3.4 1.6 3.7 17.5 20.7 43.8 95.3 81.0 76.6 55.3 
UK 4.1 4.4 3.6 1.8 8.7 35.6 23.6 56.0 87.6 61.6 73.6 43.2 
EU 5.5 6.3 7.9 6.6 8.2 47.8 28.4 68.1 86.8 48.9 66.0 29.8 
 
Non-Europe 
            
Australia 5.5 5.6 5.0 3.3 10.1 40.0 28.6 63.1 85.0 43.3 67.8 35.7 
Canada 6.3 6.0 6.0 5.6 8.9 38.8 20.9 58.2 85.4 57.6 74.3 39.4 
Japan 4.2 7.0 4.7 3.7 3.1 16.6 32.7 50.8 92.8 77.5 64.1 47.3 
New Zealand 4.0 4.0 4.1 2.8 8.7 25.7 25.5 48.2 87.6 71.3 71.5 50.3 
US 3.7 3.4 3.8 2.7 8.7 31.9 23.6 47.0 87.9 65.8 73.5 51.6 
a) 2000 
OECD Employment Outlook 2002, Table C. 
Note: These data do not include those in prison.  This makes little odds except in the US where  counting those in prison would raise the inactivity rate among prime age 
men by around 2  percentage points. 
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Table 6 
 
Youth Unemployment Rate (%), 2001 
 
Age 15-24 
 
 Total Men Women 
Europe    
Austria 6.0 6.2 5.8 
Belgium 15.3 14.3 16.6 
Denmark 8.3 7.3 9.3 
Finland 19.9 19.6 20.2 
France 18.7 16.2 21.8 
Germany 8.4 9.1 7.5 
Ireland 6.2 6.4 5.8 
Italy 27.0 23.2 32.2 
Netherlands 4.4 4.2 4.5 
Norway 10.5 10.6 10.3 
Portugal 9.2 7.2 11.9 
Spain 20.8 16.1 27.0 
Sweden 11.8 12.7 10.8 
Switzerland 5.6 5.8 5.5 
UK 10.5 12.0 8.7 
EU 13.9 13.1 15.0 
 
Non-Europe 
   
Australia 12.7 13.3 12.0 
Canada 12.8 14.5 11.0 
Japan 9.7 10.7 8.7 
New Zealand 11.8 12.1 11.5 
US 10.6 11.4 9.7 
 
OECD Employment Outlook 2002, Table C. 
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